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JOINT TASK FORCE STAFFS: SEEKING A MARK ON THE WALL

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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CONTINGENCY JOINT TASK FORCES: IN SEARCH OF A MARK ON THE WALL

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
ABSTRACT . . . . .	ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . .	iii
I INTRODUCTION . . . . .	1
II WHAT IS ON THE HORIZON . . . . .	3
Chaos . . . . .	3
Scenarios . . . . .	3
III JOINT TASK FORCES . . . . .	5
Background . . . . .	5
Joint Doctrine . . . . .	6
History of Development . . . . .	7
Test and Evaluation JTFs . . . . .	7
Standing JTFs . . . . .	8
Rapid Deployment JTF . . . . .	9
Contingency JTF Doctrine . . . . .	10
IV THREE APPROACHES TO CONTINGENCY STAFF TRAINING . . . . .	11
European Command . . . . .	12
Pacific Command . . . . .	15
The Joint Staff . . . . .	17
V SUMMARY . . . . .	19
VI RECOMMENDATION . . . . .	22
NOTES . . . . .	23
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . .	26

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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

Today, we are making joint action practiced and routine. Whether we have years to plan and rehearse, as for the Normandy invasion, months as for Operation Desert Storm, or only a few days, the US Armed Forces must always be ready to operate in smoothly functioning joint teams.<sup>1</sup>

General Colin Powell

Why isn't an example of a short notice contingency operation cited? Because this quote from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's introduction to Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces; subtly underlies the weak link in US post Cold War operational capabilities. In spite of universal agreement that: "US Armed Forces must always be ready to operate in smoothly functioning joint teams"; exactly how to organize, prepare and train contingency Joint Task Force (JTF) staffs remains an issue without a fully satisfactory answer. Unified combatant commanders continue to struggle with the organization and training of JTF staffs. The problem is being approached from three different angles. First, unified commanders and the Joint Chiefs have in some instances created complete, distinct standing JTF staffs. A second option is the designation of unified command joint staff and service component command personnel by billet position to contingency JTFs. Upon activation, this designated group of trained personnel becomes a

JTF staff. The third option is to establish standardized procedures and train all staff eligible personnel to JTF level competencies. Each of these approaches has fundamental strengths and weaknesses. This paper proposes an integration of all three: standing JTF staffs, cadre staffs and universal joint staff competencies, as a solution that balances resource constraints, operational requirements and service differences. This integrated approach blends the focus and objectivity of a permanent staff, the flexibility of gathering functional and operational experts and depth from a set of common principles and understanding. JTF staffs prepared and trained based on an objective focus, with inherent flexibility and depth will be more ready to operate as smoothly functioning, successful staff teams in a world filled with crisis contingency operations.

## CHAPTER II

### WHAT IS ON THE HORIZON?

As the continuing turmoil in virtually every region of the world underscores, we have not achieved a permanent peace. Although the forces of integration are stronger than ever, new and in some cases dormant forces of fragmentation have also been unleashed. Even as the danger of global war recedes, the potential for still highly destructive conflicts between nations and within nations is growing. We simply do not and cannot know all the challenges in the future.<sup>1</sup>

National Security Strategy 1993

Chaos. The world on the horizon is one of frequent unexpected crisis demanding rapid applications of United States military power. Chaos is becoming commonplace. Complex multi-polar confrontations, engagements and activities are replacing the relative simplicity and stability of the Cold War's bi-polar world. Multiple, dispersed and unpredictable threats are and will continue to confound attempts to precisely preposition forces. International and interagency coalitions supplant traditional organizational structures.

Scenarios. Today's non-traditional missions are tomorrow's routine operations. United States' military forces will be both smaller and busier in the world of disorder on the horizon. Quickly executed, no notice raids conducted unilaterally or in concert with the United Nations or regional coalitions will be called upon to: seize weapons of mass destruction, rescue

hostages and thwart aggression around the globe. Strikes support one nation's sovereignty or return a legitimate government to power. Closer to home, drugs are interdicted, illegal immigration is countered and internal unrest is stifled. Joint expeditionary forces exert influence around the world, deterring conflict and confrontation by projecting power from the sea. Simultaneously, and in another part of the world, a second joint expeditionary force executes an evacuation and orchestrates a relief effort along an earthquake ravaged coastline. Finally, in a third area, an expeditionary force is the enabling force committed to defusing a long standing border dispute conflict.<sup>2</sup> The purpose of outlining some of the scenarios requiring contingency operations is not to merely list possibilities. The daily paper clearly demonstrates that these hypothetical scenarios and others still unexpected are rapidly changing from possibilities, to probabilities, to reality. Today's scenarios are tomorrows joint military operations in Bosnia, Haiti, Columbia, Iran, Sudan, Libya, Panama and the Spratley Islands. In the vast majority of future military engagements a JTF staff will plan and execute the operation.



## CHAPTER III

### JOINT TASK FORCES

After a gestation period of nearly a decade, a fundamental shift in military thinking has finally taken hold: in the Post Cold War World, the JTF has become the hallmark of US military operations.<sup>1</sup>

Background. There is some danger in limiting the historic view of the evolution of the JTF to the past ten years, or even the post World War II period. There are in fact many lessons learned and unlearned stretching back to the earliest days of United States' military operations. Only years after the birth of our nation, successful Army Navy task forces operated in the Great Lakes area in the War of 1812.<sup>2</sup> During the Civil War, a joint force deployed and supported General McClellan's Army for the Peninsula Campaign and another ultimately led to General Grant's key Union victory at Vicksburg.<sup>3</sup> Yet by the turn of the century, ad-hoc staff planning was cited as the cause of "confusion and lack of coordinated joint military action" during the Cuban Campaign of the Spanish-American War.<sup>4</sup> For the next 80 plus years the focus has been to correct deficiencies with the top of the national military organizational structure. The on-again off-again Joint Army Navy Board attempted but ultimately failed to integrate planning and operations between the services until World War II.<sup>5</sup> Originally designed as a

temporary ad-hoc organization, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, created to deal with the British Chief of Staff Committee in 1942, lasted beyond World War II and became the first formal United States permanent Joint Staff.<sup>6</sup> Throughout the Cold War, a series of poorly planned and executed short notice contingency operations including: Lebanon in 1958, the Congo in 1964, the Dominican Republic in 1965, the Mayaguez Operation in 1975, the Iranian Hostage Rescue attempt in 1980 and Urgent Fury/Grenada in 1984 were cited as evidence of major inadequacies in joint doctrine, training and capabilities.<sup>7</sup> The resultant Congressional demand for reform culminated in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. This legislation not only expanded and centralized the authority and responsibility of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff but required the development of joint doctrine for planning and executing joint operations.<sup>8</sup>

Joint Doctrine. The first Joint Doctrine Master Plan was released in 1987 and it clearly identified the highest priority requirement as "doctrine for forming and employing a JTF."<sup>9</sup> Joint Pub 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures was drafted to fill the void and provide Unified Commanders with guidance for organizing and training JTFs. Joint Pub 5-00.2's formal evaluation during BRIM FROST 89, COBRA GOLD 89 and Ocean Venture 90 failed to fully test it in a short notice contingency operation.<sup>10</sup> Although initially released as

a test publication in 1989, it was not used by the Commander in Chief Southern Command (CINSO) during Just Cause in Panama or by Commander in Chief Central Command (CINCCENT) for Desert Shield or Storm. Joint Pub 5-00.2 became an official publication in September 1991. Unified commanders, however, find it lacking specific guidance and therefore continue evaluating and improving it in theater level exercises and publications.

Historic Development of JTFs. "Joint and Combined Task Forces, like the crises that bring them into being, are creatures of fluid dynamics."<sup>11</sup> The definition and description of a JTF are found in the publications, Joint Action Armed Forces and Dictionary of Military Terms for Joint Usage, both originally issued as a result of the National Security Act of 1947.<sup>12</sup> The absence of specific guidance concerning the formation of JTFs in the first Staff Officer's Manual for Joint Operations in 1948 remains consistent through release of Joint Pub 5-00.2 in 1991. During that period the United States deployed and employed its armed forces over 250 times, the vast majority in joint contingency operations.<sup>13</sup> Yet it is only in the past five years that JTFs have become the rule rather than the exception for dealing with crisis generated contingencies.

Test and Evaluation JTFs. The earliest JTFs, numbered JTF 1, 2 and 3, were formed by the JCS to conduct large scale nuclear weapons tests and weapons system evaluations. JCS

established JTF 1 in 1946 "to carry out the atomic bombing of a target array of naval ships" and is better known as operation Crossroads or the Bikini tests.<sup>14</sup> JTF 3, also known as Operation Greenhouse established another joint test and evaluation staff responsible for conducting a series of above ground atomic tests from the Kwajalein Range in the Marshall Islands.<sup>15</sup> In the late 1960s, JTF 2 was established to "plan, direct and evaluate low-altitude penetrator tests of strategic and tactical aircraft and to conduct evaluations of weapons systems defending against attacking aircraft at low altitude" operating from Sandia Base, New Mexico.<sup>16</sup> Government agencies and the JCS continue to create numbered JTFs responsible for interagency and multi-service tests of major weapons systems. Two current examples are JTF-17 which is studying the Advanced Tactical Fighter while JTF-22 is establishing parameters for Future Strike Aircraft. However, the focus during the 1980s changed from test and evaluation JTFs to standing operational JTFs under unified and specified commanders.

Standing JTFs. The Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), JTFs 4, 5 and 6 and JTF-Bravo are all standing JTFs activated within the past ten years that contradict the "temporary nature and specific limited objective" prescribed for JTFs in JCS Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).<sup>17</sup> JTF 4, 5 and 6 respectively support Commander in Chief Atlantic (CINCLANT), Pacific (CINCPAC) and Forces Command's (CINCFOR) counter

narcotics missions. JTF-Bravo executes command and control of U.S. Forces training in Honduras for CINCSO and JSOC is the JTF executing the nation's dedicated standing external counter-terrorist operations.<sup>18</sup> The staffs of these JTFs have much more permanence than those formed for short notice crisis generated contingencies. All have permanent headquarters facilities, designated communications and their personnel positions are in various degrees of being documented as authorized rather than taken out of hide. The experience gained in creating these standing JTFs is developing both joint and interagency staff expertise, but has provided little benefit regarding crisis generated contingencies. U.S. Latin American and counter terror policy and the role of the military in the war on drugs has received much attention. However, the lessons learned from within these standing JTFs are not appropriate or useful for no-notice staff activations and contingency operations.

Rapid Deployment Standing JTF. One other standing JTF and its staff deserves scrutiny. The Carter Doctrine of 1976 generated the creation of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) to deal with world wide contingencies with a focusing on the Middle East and Persian Gulf Region following the fall of the Shah of Iran. The RDJTF was a JCS JTF for unspecified contingency operations. Again the long duration and unspecified nature of the RDJTF was contradictory to joint doctrine. By 1983 RDJTF had been reorganized as a Unified Command, U.S.

Central Command (USCENTCOM).<sup>19</sup> Standing JTFs during the 1970s and 1980s are part of the evolutionary process which led the development of doctrine for contingency JTFs.

Contingency JTF Doctrine. During the summer of 1987, only a year after the Goldwater-Nicholas Legislation, two unified commanders queried the JCS concerning joint doctrine for forming JTFs. General Christ from CENTCOM proposed creating a JTF to execute the escort of reflagged Kuwaiti tankers and General Galvin in Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) was preparing for a confrontation in Panama. Both sought specific guidance "on how to form and employ a JTF."<sup>20</sup> In retrospect, Ernest Will and Just Cause, as these two operations would become known, signaled the transition of focus to no notice crisis generated JTF executed contingency operations. Within a little over two years JTFs were becoming the military way of operating and a household word for Americans who read about JTF Provide Comfort saving Kurdish refugees, Provide Hope feeding our former Soviet enemies, Provide Promise supporting the United Nations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Restore Hope bringing food and enforcing peace in Somalia.<sup>21</sup> There are and will be many more crisis generated contingency operations. "The JTF concept is now firmly embedded in the military planning process" and yet, there remains much discussion of how to prepare JTF staffs for the continuing rash of unexpected contingency operations.<sup>22</sup>

## CHAPTER IV

### THREE APPROACHES TO JTF STAFF TRAINING

"Now, Frost said, the composition of JTF staffs is driven by mission demands. There are two things you have to form, he said. "There's the immediate staff for the commander, and there's the architecture for his subordinate commands. We have big debates over this, and there's not a single answer."<sup>1</sup> . . . . . Rear Admiral David E. Frost

There are many approaches to preparing for unexpected JTF activations discussed, debated and tested by the unified combatant commanders and as Rear Admiral Frost indicates there is clearly no consensus among them. European Command (EUCOM) continues to experiment primarily with creating contingency JTFs from a designated rapidly deployable element of the EUCOM Headquarter's Joint Staff. Another approach, documented and being evaluated by the Pacific Command (PACOM), is the designation of subordinate component commands as contingency JTFs. This concept essentially creates standing JTFs without specified missions. Finally, there is a JCS initiative to formally train and evaluate more military leaders at lower levels in JTF staff competencies. This approach cuts across the spectrum of joint policy, unified commands and services. Each of these three approaches has a number of critical strengths and weaknesses that are evident under closer scrutiny.

### The EUCOM Approach.

"Given the likelihood of future fast rising crises and America's regionally focused defense strategy we have undertaken several initiatives to improve USEUCOM's ability to respond decisively to regional flare-ups. Those initiatives also respond to the direction in the National Military Strategy that regional CINCs be prepared to use force in time of crises by forming appropriately tailored task forces. Consequently, we have focused our initiatives on forming, deploying, and employing JTFs. The resulting programs seek to enhance USEUCOM's contingency planning; crisis assessment; crisis action organization and JTF cadre preparation...<sup>2</sup>

Over the past two and a half years, EUCOM has responded to more JTF contingencies than any other unified command.<sup>3</sup> That experience coupled with a demanding internal JTF exercise program is currently used to institutionalize the contingency JTF activation process. EUCOM's approach designates a cadre or core staff of officers from EUCOM Headquarters to fill specific positions on all JTF staffs. This core staff "brings a degree of familiarity and continuity to operations."<sup>4</sup> Other positions are filled based on mission requirements and normally bring specific expertise from supporting component commands and provide liaison back to those commands. The first and most obvious benefit of this approach to institutionalizing the formation of a JTF staff for contingency operations, is a linkage of initial planning and future operations. Some of the joint staff officers (JSOs) on the EUCOM staff who work Crisis



Action Planning between the combatant command and JCS become members of the JTF staff upon activation. Their familiarity with the history of the operation, course of action development and the rest of the EUCOM staff make their transition from unified command planners to JTF staff executors virtually seamless. Additionally, many component staff officers who were counterparts or contacts are assigned to the JTF providing a second level of continuity.

USEUCOM's CJTF (Combined and Joint Task Force) Provide Comfort, the multi nation U.S. led task force protecting and providing humanitarian assistance to the Kurds in Northern Iraq, and last summer's JTF-Field Training Exercise (FTX), Elipse Bravo, provide an example of the interaction between operational lessons learned and innovative training currently taking place in EUCOM. The flexible response to numerous unforeseen demands demonstrated by the Provide Comfort CTF staff integrating peace making, peace keeping and humanitarian assistance in the mountains of Northern Iraq was built into the JTF-FTX scenario.

Designated JSOs from the EUCOM staff, most of whom had been members of the command's Crisis Action Team(CAT) formed and deployed to Turkey as the Provide Comfort JTF. They subsequently merged with the military staffs of other nations to become the CTF staff. Operation Provide Comfort changed dramatically over its existence. Initially commanded by Lieutenant General Jamerson (USAF) and made up predominantly of

tactical airlift units dropping relief supplies, it transitioned under Lieutenant General Shalikashvili (USA) to a protection and resettlement operation using Army, Marine and Air Force units and ultimately became a "no fly zone" protection operation again commanded by Lieutenant General Jamerson.<sup>5</sup> In spite of these changes, most of the original core cadre of JSOs remained the key leaders on the CTF staff. Because of its complexity, changing missions and thirteen nation coalition; Operation Provide Comfort's success in its efforts to: "Stop the death; disease and starvation in the mountains and return the Kurds to their homes in record time" destined its place as a model for future operations.<sup>6</sup>

To capitalize on operational successes like Provide Comfort, USECOM instituted a series of JTF exercises to train, evaluate and improve its JTF cadre concept in various challenging situations. In the summer of 1992 one of three contingency JTF exercises, JTF-FTX, found the cadre staff embarked on the carrier Saratoga controlling Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Forces. Admiral Owens, the JTF commander describes the action: "We had an exercise one evening where we had four different objectives, one at sea and three ashore, where we used all four services in a coordinated operation to assault three areas, plus the sea based areas, within 30 seconds of each other."<sup>7</sup> Before the "exercise" ended it assumed a real world operational mission and was designated Elipse Bravo. The JTF core staff's

flexibility and familiarity with EUCOM and JCS made this transition to contingency operations seem easy. All indications are that EUCOM's training and operational approach to contingency JTF staffs will continue to follow in the successful footsteps of Provide Comfort, JTF-FTX 92 and Elipse Bravo.

The Pacific Command Approach.

Contingency JTF - Normally, USCINCPAC's three designated uni-service headquarters. One of these would be activated as a contingency JTF and assume OPCON of Joint Forces during crisis within the USPACOM area of responsibility."<sup>8</sup>  
USCINPACINST 3120-2GE

CINCPAC plans to form contingency JTFs from its component combatant command headquarters. Internal plans, procedures and instructions prepare the Naval service's, 7th Fleet and 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force, Army's I Corps and the Air Force's 13th Air Force to assume responsibility for executing contingency JTF command. These responsibilities are delineated in current Standard Operating Procedures and include requirements to: "Activate JTF Headquarters, act as operational level headquarters for contingency operations. Request necessary staff augmentation and support, provide logistical, administrative, communications, and other support to activate, deploy, and employ JTF headquarters and forces."<sup>9</sup> The strength of this approach is that the component commands have existing, working staffs with operationally ready support structures, essentially standing JTF headquarters. These headquarters are

tailored and modified as directed so that specific joint requirements are met upon activation. Another strength of the PACOM approach is the availability of contingency JTFs with orientations for missions requiring predominantly air, land, sea and amphibious operations based on the particular type component headquarters selected. Unlike EUCOM, PACOM has not had operationally generated opportunities to test, evaluate and exercise its uni-service contingency JTF approach. During 1992, previously scheduled non contingency JTF exercises were modified to incorporate JTF staff training. Between 1993 and 1995 four specific JTF training exercises are scheduled.<sup>10</sup>

Interestingly, the January 1993 revision of CINCPAC's Joint Task Force Standard Operating Procedure includes a Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell (DJTFAC). The DJTFAC is being created to: "provide the CJTF with a joint staff planning capability not normally available to a uni-service command."<sup>11</sup> The proposed composition of a DJTFAC is 20-24 personnel including: 15 from the CINCPAC staff, 5 from each component and one each from the Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) and special operations sub unified command.<sup>12</sup> CINCPAC has established a long range training plan that links the DJTFAC with each of its uni-service potential contingency JTF staff in an exercise by 1995. This plan emphasizes a continuous modification of overall procedures as well as DJTFAC personnel and equipment composition. PACOM's traditional approach to establishing

subordinate commands and task forces for contingency operations requiring jointness provides for four standing JTF headquarters with capabilities and assets dispersed throughout its huge area of responsibility.

The Integrated Approach.

Our panel report listed the attributes of the JSO - a thorough knowledge of his or her own service, some knowledge of the other services, experience operating with other services, trust and confidence in other services and the perspective to see the "joint" picture. Ultimately a JSO must understand the capabilities and limitations, doctrine and culture of the other service.<sup>13</sup>

House Armed Services (HASC) Panel on Military Education

JSOs with the attributes described in the HASC panel report are a critical component of both the PACOM and EUCOM approach to resolving problems forming contingency JTFs. Yet a third complimentary approach is to educate and train officers and non commissioned officers in the attributes and competencies required to serve on a joint staff at all service levels where a JTF could be formed. Congressman Skelton, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee's Panel on Military Education, proposes that future smaller more capable joint forces demand joint training at lower levels.<sup>14</sup> Although all services have begun programs to integrate joint familiarization in all formal schools and a Phase 1 course at the intermediate level; only the Armed Forces Staff College's 12 week course provides Phase II JSO instruction and qualification.<sup>15</sup> Current arguments and

problems in expanding JSO qualification to a broader spectrum of military leaders include: funding limitations, academic instituting capacities and the contentious issue of jeopardizing service expertise for joint qualification.

JSO qualification has always included education and experience. Dramatic change in the CJCS exercise program's focus for Fiscal Years 1992 to 1995 indicates a determined effort to push joint staff experience and joint operational opportunities to lower levels. This approach is coupled with on-going educational initiatives to improve the abilities of both JSOs and service staff officers for contingency JTF duties. The head of the Joint Exercise Training Division at JCS is focusing on "smaller joint exercise spread out around the world...for joint operations to work effectively soldiers, sailors and airmen need to train together at an earlier stage in their training regimen than was commonly thought just five or six years ago."<sup>16</sup>

In the future, the creation of qualified leaders capable of filling key staff positions in both service and joint organizations may resolve most difficulties forming contingency JTFs. Today's realities, however, include resource limits and a lack of developed joint doctrine. Contingency JTF operations and exercises by the unified commands provides a source for evolving doctrine and its institutional training. However, neither aspect can accelerate independently from the other.

## CHAPTER V

### SUMMARY

"We merged those two ideas and finally in November we said, Why don't we talk about a JTF if we ever do this?"<sup>1</sup> As in the case of JTF Proven Force, EUCOM operations in support of Desert Shield and Storm from Turkey, often the synthesis of different ideas, concepts and approaches provides the best possible solution. Since identifying the problem is often the first and most difficult step in problem solving; the good news is the clear focus at various levels and in diverse commands on forming and resourcing JTF staffs. Each of the three approaches reviewed provide a method for improving joint staff experience and capabilities in forming contingency JTFs. Although all three have strengths and are demonstrating increasing success in operations and exercises, each has limitations and weaknesses.

EUCOM's cadre or core staff approach allows the smoothest transition and coordination. However, any contingency JTF activation removes key players from the unified command staff and more than one activated concurrently severely impacts the unified command's headquarters capabilities. Additionally, the experience and training are oriented on the unified headquarters and its JSOs rather than on subordinate headquarters staff

personnel. This factor limits training options for multiple contingency JTF activations and violates the principle of decentralized execution.

PACOMs uni-service (virtually standing) JTFs provide for both decentralized execution and multiple concurrent contingency JTF capability. This approach tends to maintain a service vice joint orientation of the JTF staff and, although to a lesser degree than EUCOM's core staff, degrades the unified headquarters joint staff. Another weakness of this approach is that it seems to restrict forming contingency JTFs to the component command level in spite of the trend toward activating JTFs at much lower levels. The PACOM approach will need expansion or modification to include this capability.

The JCS integrated approach, expanding the education and exercise opportunities for military leaders across services and throughout a greater portion of careers, is certainly the long term solution. If military leaders at all levels were JSO qualified, forming contingency JTF staffs becomes easy. Although, the current reduction in force facilitates this transition by creating more capable forces and qualified leaders; the cost of training and exercising middle and junior leaders to JSO competencies is still prohibitive. Most critically, service peculiar command, warfighting and staff skills must not be jeopardized in the process. Today's career patterns, institutional curriculums and service operational



requirements make junior and middle grade JSOs a long term goal rather than a short term stand alone solution. In addition, the premature still emerging state of joint doctrine for forming contingency JTFs, continues to hamper the educational process.

A review of all three approaches reveal that if combined their strengths are complimentary and negate most of the weaknesses. The EUCOM philosophy of core or cadre JTF staff combined with PACOM's designated component headquarters elements trained and equipped for contingency JTF operations provides maximum flexibility, coordination, decentralization and objective focus. Operational and exercise lessons learned allow continued expansion of the understanding and depth of JSO competencies throughout the military force. As this process makes headway, the requirement for resourcing contingency JTFs from the unified headquarter's staff is reduced. Although it is impossible to quantify, the combination of the three approaches appears to have a benefit far greater than the sum of each of the individual elements.

## CHAPTER VI

### RECOMMENDATION

"Until we know exactly what is required, let's confine our decisions to the training we know we must complete. We have enough to do without trying to anticipate everything that comes out of Washington." Gen. Patton paused, "Besides, chances are Washington will issue a dozen revisions before they give us their final plan."<sup>1</sup>

The innovative approaches of operational level CINCs combined with doctrinal and institutional progress at the JCS level provide the best solution to eliminating many of the inherent problems encountered during contingency JTF activations. Continued discussions between the warfighters and those tasked with codifying joint doctrine are essential. One specific proposal meriting consideration is the integration of core or cadre JTF staffs with designated component or subordinate commands as contingency, standing JTFs. It is time to apply the unified commander's lessons learned in combination with JCS's doctrinal effort. This process will provide a basis or foundation for further improvements and refinement of the variety of different concepts currently employed. This proposal is not "the only" or necessarily even the best solution, but it is one that is currently overlooked. It's a mark on the wall.

## NOTES

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